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This paper empirically investigates the determinants and dynamics of trade credit use  by 
newly  established  entrepreneurial  ventures.  At  the  time  of start-up,  default  risk  and 
financial constraints are typically large.  Also,  start-ups have no  established relationships 
with  banks  and  suppliers.  As  firms  grow  older,  these  characteristics  become  less 
pronounced.  As a result, business start-ups provide an excellent case for  testing various 
hypotheses  on why firms  use  trade credit.  We  find that  start-ups use  more trade  credit 
when financial constraints are large, when suppliers have a financing advantage over banks 
in financing high-risk firms, when entrepreneurs value private benefits of control and when 
transaction costs are important.  Furthermore, the time series implications of  these theories 
are supported. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Trade  credit  arises  whenever  a  buyer  defers  payments  to  his  suppliers.!  Wilson  and 
Summers (2002) report that more than 80% of commercial transactions in the u.K. are on 
credit terms.  In Belgium, the country from which our sample is drawn, 95% of industrial 
firms have accounts payable outstanding.  Even though payments to suppliers usually can 
be  delayed for  only a short period of time,  firms  are continuously involved in  business 
transactions,  which  makes  commercial  debt  de  facto  an  important  component  of the 
balance sheet and, thus, a major source of financing for most firms.  Ng et af.  (1999), for 
instance, document that during the 1990s, trade credit represented approximately 2.5 times 
the combined value of all new public debt and primary equity issues in the U.S.  In 2001, 
Belgian  industrial  firms  on  average  deferred  their  payments  for  84  days  and  accounts 
payable represented 18.10% of  equity and total liabilities. 
Several  studies have  examined the  determinants  of firm  reliance  on commercial 
debt.  It turns  out that a  major purpose of using  trade  credit  is  to  overcome  fmancial 
constraints.  Firms likely to be bank credit constrained tend to rely more on trade credit, as 
shown  by  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1997),  Danielson  and  Scott  (2002),  among  others. 
Simultaneously, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that longer banking relationships reduce 
the use of commercial debt.  For linked firms, Deloof and Jegers (1996) conclude that a 
shortage of liquid funds  lowers payment extension in intragroup trading.  At the macro-
economic level, Nilsen (2002) finds  that during periods of tight (bank) credit, small firms 
react by borrowing more from  their  suppliers.  Also, Breig (1994)  demonstrates that in 
economies with well-developed financial markets, firms are financed less by suppliers. 
1  Usually,  suppliers  consent to  a period  during  which  payments  can be  postponed;  full  payment  then  is 
required at the end of this net period (one-part or net credit terms).  Alternatively, suppliers may offer two-
part credit terms;  they still  delineate  a net  period,  but also  specify a shorter period,  the  discount period, 
during  which payment will  attract a discount.  Generally,  the  credit terms  are  set such that trade  credit is 
costly for buyers who forego the discount.  For an excellent overview of  possible payment terms, see Ng et at. 
(1999) and Wilson and Summers (2002). 
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Next, Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that firms with higher profit margins have 
higher levels of accounts receivable, which is  interpreted as  indirect support for  the price 
discrimination motive for offering trade credit (e.g., Brennan et aI., 1988; Mian and Smith, 
1992).  Finally, there  is  some  limited support for  the transaction costs theories  of trade 
credit.  Wilson and Summers (2002), for example, find that firms whose buyers order more 
frequently offer longer credit periods, verifying the  idea that trade credit can be  used to 
reduce the transaction costs of paying bills.  Also,  models  that explain trade credit as  a 
means  for  customers  to  inspect  product  quality  before  paying  and,  thus,  reducing  the 
transaction costs of concluding sales deals, have been empirically validated.  Long et af. 
(1993), for  instance, find that smaller firms  and firms  fabricating products whose quality 
requires longer time to assess extend more credit relative to sales. 
The above results stem from examining established -large or smale - firms.  It is 
unclear  to  what  extent  these  conclusions  generalize  to  newly  founded  entrepreneurial 
ventures.  For new firms in traditional industries, the external fmancing sources usually are 
limited and mainly consist of bank loans and commercial debt.3  Furthermore, these papers 
investigate  the  cross-sectional  determinants  of the  size  of accounts  payable  (accounts 
receivable) relative to other financing sources.  Not surprisingly, Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
claim that  the  single  most  important  challenge  for  future  research  is  to  examine  the 
determinants  of  trade  credit  use  over  time.  Time  series  data  on  newly  founded 
entrepreneurial ventures  are  very  suitable to  study the  latter  research question.  Indeed, 
start-ups have some unique features at the moment of start-up, which fade away over time. 
These changing characteristics likely will be reflected in their use of  commercial debt. 
2  Small established firms  are  examined in Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Wilson and Sununers (2002), for 
example.  Long et al.  (1993) and Deloof and Jegers (1996) analyse large established firms. 
3 Berger and Udell (1998) discuss the sources of financing fInns can access according to their age.  Typically, 
venture capital is only available for firms in specific industries, and in Continental Europe, venture capitalists 
largely finance firms in the growth rather than start-up stage (Ooghe et at., 1991). 
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Most importantly,  business  start-ups  face  high failure  rates  in  the  early years  of 
their life.  Dun &  Bradstreet (1994), for instance, document that approximately 50% of all 
firms that failed in  1993  did so  in the first five years of their existence.  Likewise, of all 
Belgian firms that went bankrupt in 2002,41.04% was younger than five years.  These high 
failure rates limit start-up access to bank loans, and firms may need to rely on trade credit. 
However, for  firms  that survive the start-up stage,  banks may provide reasonably priced 
loans, resulting in a reduced use of  trade credit as time goes by.  High default risk may also 
imply that at  start-up, entrepreneurs  worry  about the  liquidation of their  venture  in  the 
event of future  financial distress, especially if they value control rights.  If suppliers are 
more  lenient  than  banks  towards  distressed  firms,  as  argued  by  Wilner  (2000)  among 
others, entrepreneurs may prefer trade credit during the high-default risk years. 
A second important feature of newly created firms is that they have no history and, 
thus, no established relationships  with suppliers.  During their first  few  years,  start-ups 
could therefore  use  the  credit period to  inspect product quality  before paying.  As  the 
supplier-buyer  relationship  gradually  develops,  firms  may  be  more  inclined  to  rely  on 
supplier  reputation  and  no  longer  need  to  verify  the  quality  of supplies.  The  above 
discussion shows that many theories of trade credit financing have dynamic implications, 
which distinctly manifest in the case of business start-ups.  An important issue  in trade 
credit research therefore is to examine the determinants of commercial debt use over time. 
Our  study  is  the  first  to  examine  these  dynamics  using  unique  panel  data  on  328 
entrepreneurial ventures that are newly established in 1992 and followed during a period of 
ten years after start-up. 
The results of our study show that financial  constraints increase trade credit use. 
Specifically, start-ups with low internal cash generation rely  more on commercial debt. 
Simultaneously,  firms  that  pay  a  higher  price  for  their  bank  debt  borrow  more  from 
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suppliers, especially when the industry is growing.  Next, the results suggest that suppliers 
may have an advantage in financing high-risk start-ups.  On the one hand, when default risk 
is  substantial and inventories are frequently  replaced or mainly consist of raw materials, 
start-ups  use  more  trade  credit,  ceteris  paribus.  Repeated  ordering  allows  suppliers  to 
collect more timely information on customer creditworthiness whereas  slowly processed 
inventories increase the  collateral value of delivered goods.  Both features  are  valuable 
with high-risk buyers and our results indicate that they lead to  a financing  advantage for 
suppliers.  Interestingly, the positive relation between the  turnover of raw materials  and 
accounts  payable  decreases  when  high-risk  start-ups  grow  older,  indicating  that  the 
information advantage of suppliers over banks decreases as start-ups mature.  On the other 
hand,  when the  industry  is  highly  concentrated and  thus  the  supplier's opportunities to 
control buyers are limited, high-risk start-ups have lower accounts payable.  Finally, when 
ownership is  concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneur, firms borrow more from their 
suppliers.  This finding is consistent with the argument that suppliers are relatively lenient 
towards  firms  in  financial  distress,  which  is  treasured  especially  by  entrepreneurs  who 
value control rights.  As  firms age, the positive relation between ownership structure and 
accounts  payable  weakens,  which  presumably  reflects  the  entrepreneur's  increasing 
confidence in the firm's survival chances. 
Also, the transaction costs theories of  trade credit are supported empirically.  On the 
one hand, in industries with high raw materials' turnover rates,  start-ups use trade credit 
more  extensively.  This  relation  suggests  that  trade  credit  can  be  used  to  reduce  the 
transaction costs of paying bills.  On the other hand, in industries with high investments in 
intangible assets, where quality of input goods could be crucial, firms have higher accounts 
payable.  Furthermore, the results indicate that the positive relation between product quality 
and accounts payable decreases as  firms grow older.  We  interpret this result as  evidence 
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that  supplier  reputation  and  relationships  can  substitute  for  trade  credit  as  a  signal  of 
product quality. 
The remainder of the article is  organized as  follows.  In Section 2,  we discuss the 
main theories  of trade  credit financing  and  argue  how these  may  affect  the  funding  of 
business start-ups, at the time of start-up and during the years thereafter.  In Section 3, we 
describe the data.  Section 4 empirically examines the determinants and dynamics of trade 
credit use by entrepreneurial start-ups.  Section 5 offers our conclusions. 
2. THEORY AND TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS 
The early academic literature on commercial debt argues that trade credit is  extended by 
unsophisticated market participants,  who  consider  it  as  a means  to  secure  sales.  More 
recent theories stress that suppliers may have an advantage in financing high-risk buyers 
and that entrepreneurs with large private benefits of control may favor  commercial debt 
financing.  Simultaneously,  others  have argued that trade  credit can help  to  reduce  the 
transaction  costs  of the  sales'  cycle.  Below,  we  briefly  review  these  theories  and 
investigate how their  validity may  be  affected  by firm  age;  the  testable  hypotheses  are 
summarized in  Table  1.  In this  discussion,  we  recognize that accounts payable are  the 
result of  both the supply and the demand for trade credit. 
(i)  Financial constraints and  price discrimination theory of  trade credit 
The credit terms that are offered by suppliers affect the effective price of their goods and 
services.4  For instance, when suppliers lengthen the net period, they essentially offer firms 
an  interest-free  loan,  which  reduces  the  present  value  of the  price  that  customers  pay. 
Likewise, a higher discount for early payment decreases the price of  goods and services for 
4 Wilson and Summers (2002) point out that allowing buyers to pay late without penalty also influences the 
effective price that customers pay. 
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buyers that pay fast.  Suppliers thus could use trade credit as a way to price discriminate, 
especially when direct discrimination through prices  is  impossible (e.g.,  Brennan et at., 
1988; Mian and Smith, 1992).  Yet, while suppliers do have the option to decide whether or 
not  to  offer  payment  delay  to  their  customers,  price  discrimination  regulation  usually 
forbids  that credit terms  be  tuned to  specific  buyers.  In Europe,  the  European Treaty 
allows  firms  whose  competitive  position  is  harmed  by  price  discrimination,  whether 
explicit  or  implicit,  to  file  a  lawsuit;  similarly,  in  the  U.S.  the  Robinson-Patman  Act 
literally  forbids  price  discrimination  through  credit  terms.  Suppliers  thus  are  legally 
constrained in varying their credit terms across customers.  This restriction may help to 
explain the limited variability of credit terms within industries as  observed by Ng et ai. 
(1999) among others. 
Even with fixed  credit terms,  suppliers  could still  use  commercial  debt to  boost 
sales, provided that it reduces the effective price of goods and services for price sensitive 
firms.  The  price  elasticity  of demand  is  likely  to  be  high  especially  for  financially 
constrained buyers.  When suppliers now determine credit terms such that taking up trade 
credit is  costly, financially constrained firms may still use it (as other sources of fmancing 
can  be  assumed  to  have  an  infinite  implicit  cost)  whereas  non-constrained  firms  will 
consider commercial debt to  be too costly.  Setting a relatively high price for trade credit, 
which  is  consistent  with  the  empirical  literature,  thus  may  allow  suppliers  to  price 
discriminate without violating the regulation.  Brennan et al.  (1988) claim that suppliers 
may  have  an  incentive  to  price  discriminate  especially  when  competition  in  the  input 
market is low. 
The above arguments thus conjecture that suppliers may use trade credit terms to 
pnce  discriminate  and  that  buyers  will  use  the  extended  credit  only  when  they  are 
financially constrained.  Stmi-ups typically face significant financial constraints.  Laitinen 
6 Determinants and Dynamics afTrade Credit Use 
(1994), for instance, confirms that the initial cash generation of  start-ups is highly unceliain 
and  often  negative,  such  that  their  internal  sources  of financing  are  limited.  Also, 
Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2002) find that banks finance a smaller portion of assets 
and operations for newly established firms in industries with high historical start-up failure 
rates.  As a result, start-ups with limited internal cash production (EBITDAI  ASSETS) and 
start-ups that pay a higher price for  their bank debt (COST OF  BANK DEBT = spread 
between the  interest rate  on bank loans  and the  risk-free  rate)  may rely  more  on trade 
credit.  Based upon the price discrimination  argument,  we  expect this  relation between 
financial  constraints and accounts payable to  be  stronger when competition in the input 
market  is  low.  Following  Symeonidis  (2003),  high-growth  industries  (IND  SALES 
GROWTH =  average  sales  growth rate  over  1992-2002  in the  corresponding  four-digit 
NACE  industry)  are  considered to  be  less  competitive.  Once  firms  grow  older,  they 
presumably  will  generate  positive  and  more  stable  cash  flows  and  obtain  access  to 
reasonably priced bank loans.  These features will be reflected in the value of the variables 
EBITDA/ASSETS and COST OF BANK DEBT.  However, firms may no longer use the 
(costly) trade credit extended by suppliers in order to price discriminate between cash and 
credit customers when fmancial constraints decrease over time. 
(ii)  Financing advantage theories of  trade credit 
Some theories of  trade credit financing suggest that suppliers may be better able to evaluate 
and control the credit risk of  their customers than specialized financial institutions, such as 
banks.  As a result, it may be optimal for banks to indirectly finance firms with high credit 
risk by funding their suppliers (e.g., Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 1984).  At least three sources 
for the financing advantage of suppliers regarding high-risk firms  have been identified in 
the literature.  This paper is the first to also empirically differentiate between them. 
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First, suppliers may have an advantage in information acquisition: they can observe 
the  size  and timing of orders,  the  ability  of firms  to  take  advantage  of early payment 
discounts, etc. (e.g., Smith, 1987; Biais and Gollier, 1997).  Even though banks can collect 
similar  information  via  transactions  accounts,  Petersen  and  Rajan  (1997)  argue  that 
suppliers are likely to obtain the information in a faster and cheaper way since it is obtained 
in the normal course of business.  In addition, we argue that because of  the very short-term 
nature of trade credit, suppliers have the ability to  react faster when adverse information 
emerges  whereas  banks  may  have  to  await  actual  default.  Overall,  this  information 
advantage  of suppliers  is  likely  to  hold  especially  when high-risk  customers  regularly 
replace their inventories of  raw materials, i.e. when raw materials have a high turnover rate 
(IND INVENTORY TURNOVER =  average raw materials' tumover rate over 1992-2002 
in the corresponding four-digit industry).  Then, information on customer creditworthiness 
will be regularly updated, allowing suppliers to adjust their credit policy. 
Second, suppliers may have an advantage in controlling high-risk buyers.  If  a buyer 
has few altemative sources other than the supplier, the latter could credibly threat to cut off 
future  supplies once the buyer does not respect credit terms.  Banks, in contrast, may be 
constrained by bankruptcy laws to withdraw financing (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  A 
supplier's power to control  buyers will be  larger for  customers that are  not vital to the 
supplier's  survival.  Business  start-ups  typically  are  small-scaled  firms  and  therefore 
account only for a small portion of the supplier's sales.5  However, in industries with just a 
few large buyers, suppliers are likely to welcome the start-up of a new firm as it may help 
them to become less dependent on a limited number of  large customers.  Wilner (2000), for 
example,  documents  that  suppliers  who  desire  to  maintain an  enduring product market 
relationship grant more concessions to distressed customers.  Hence, in highly concentrated 
5 When the supplier has made a specific investment in the buyer, his power to control the buyer will be lower. 
Since the business start-ups in our sample are true entrepreneurial start-ups without history, these sunk costs 
are unlikely. 
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industries (IND CONCENTRATION = percentage of industry sales that are accounted for 
by the  largest four  firms  in the corresponding four-digit industry in  1992), the supplier's 
willingness to  restrain start-ups that do  not respect credit terms could be  lower, which is 
likely to result in a lower supplier financing advantage. 
Third,  it is  often argued that in case of non-payment,  suppliers can seize unpaid 
supplied goods.  Since suppliers usually are able to resell these goods to other customers, 
they will place a higher value on them and, therefore, have an advantage in extending credit 
to  high-risk  firms  compared  to  banks  (e.g.,  Mian  and  Smith,  1992).  The  Belgian 
institutional framework,  however,  limits  suppliers'  rights  to  reclaim their unpaid  goods. 
Only when goods have not been resold or transformed, the unpaid supplier of moveable 
property has a legal privilege to  the goods delivered.  As  a result, when goods  are  only 
slowly consumed in the production process (IND INVENTORY MIX = average fraction of 
raw materials to total inventories over 1992-2002in the corresponding four-digit industry), 
they have more collateral value to the supplier and the higher the financing advantage of 
the supplier. 
Overall,  the  financing  advantage  of suppliers  is  likely  to  hold  especially  when 
failure risk (FAILURE RATE = historical start-up failure  rate in the corresponding four-
digit NACE industry, measured over 1988-1991) is high.  Under these circumstances, the 
possibility  of collecting  information  on payment behavior,  controlling  the  buyer  and/or 
selling repossessed assets is most valuable.  We therefore interact each of the three above-
discussed  variables  with  FAILURE  RATE.  Next,  we  expect  suppliers  to  have  an 
advantage in financing risky buyers especially at the time of start-up.  As start-ups survive 
the initial stage, they will find  it easier to  obtain correctly priced bank loans, curbing the 
financing advantage of  suppliers regarding high-risk firms. 
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(iii) Private benefits of  control theory of  trade credit 
Wilner  (2000)  argues  that trade  creditors  are  likely  to  grant  more  conceSSIOns  III debt 
renegotiations than credit market lenders.  The reason is that suppliers are more dependent 
on their customers, particularly when these generate a large percentage of supplier profits. 
A similar point is made by Petersen and Rajan (1997), who argue that it is the prospect of 
future  profits  that  makes  suppliers  tolerant  towards  firms  that  cannot  repay  their  trade 
credit.  Then, suppliers may be lenient even towards small-scale start-ups. 
Huyghebaert  et  al.  (2001)  investigate  the  implications  of these  arguments  for 
entrepreneurs  who  choose  between bank debt and trade  credit to  finance  their venture. 
Their model  shows  that  compared to  banks,  suppliers  adopt  a  more  lenient  liquidation 
policy for firms in financial distress but charge a higher price for their credit.  As a result, 
entrepreneurs trade off the lower price of bank debt against the  stricter bank liquidation 
policy.  Especially entrepreneurs who value private benefits of control borrow more from 
their suppliers to prevent defaulting on their bank debt.  These control rents are defined as 
the various non-pecuniary benefits associated with entrepreneurship.  Following Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), private benefits of control are proxied by the percentage of ownership in 
the hands of the entrepreneur at the time of start-up (OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION). 
However, as  the  firm matures, entrepreneurs may become more  confident in their firm's 
survival chances and reduce their use of  costly cOlmnercial debt. 
(iv)  Transaction costs theories of  trade credit 
Trade credit may reduce the transaction costs of paying bills, as  argued by Ferris (1981). 
Instead of  paying bills every time goods are delivered, firms may centralize payments at the 
end of each month or quarter and use trade credit to  bridge the period between purchase 
and payment.  These transaction costs are likely to be important especially for firms with 
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high  raw  materials'  turnover  rates  (IND  INVENTORY  TURNOVER).  Firm  age  is 
unlikely to affect this theory of trade credit use as  it is the frequency by which inventories 
are replaced that determines transaction costs.6 
Next, suppliers may extend trade credit to provide a signal of their confidence in 
product  quality  (e.g.,  Smith,  1987;  Maksimovic  and  Titman,  1991;  Long  et aI.,  1993). 
Buyers can then inspect the delivered goods during the credit period to verify their quality 
before paying.  In this  manner,  trade  credit can help  to  reduce  the  transaction  costs  of 
concluding  sales  deals.  Even  though  suppliers  may  have  established  a  reputation  for 
quality with their long-lasting customers, we argue that business start-ups may fmd it hard 
to  rely  on that  reputation.  Specifically,  when  suppliers  anticipate  that  a  lot  of newly 
founded firms do not survive, they could use start-ups as an outlet for their lower quality 
products  without  affecting  their  reputation  with  established  customers.  By  providing 
credit, suppliers can help to reduce start-up concerns about product quality.  Start-ups then 
are likely to take up the offered trade credit when product quality is  important but high-
quality supplies cannot be easily identified in advance.  Deloof and Jegers (1996) argue that 
firms  investing  more  in intangible  assets  (IND  INTANGIBLES/ASSETS  =  average  of 
intangible  assets  to  total  assets  over  1992-2002  in the  corresponding  four-digit  NACE 
industry) can be expected to produce high-tech goods, for which quality is  important but 
difficult to ascertain. 
This possibility of inspecting delivered goods will be valued especially during the 
first  years  after  start-up,  when  firms  have  not  yet  established a  relationship  with their 
suppliers.  However, as supplier-customer relationships are being developed, suppliers may 
no longer need to provide trade credit and/or buyers may fmd it less necessary to raise it in 
6 Another version of this transaction costs argument is  that with seasonalities in purchases and sales, firms 
may use trade credit to  facilitate  their cash management.  By delaying payments when sales are low,  firms 
may still be able to [mance cash outlays with internally generated resources.  In this way the transaction costs 
of contracting alternative (short-term) financing can be avoided.  Again, this argument is unlikely to  depend 
on firm age.  Unfortunately, since our database only includes annual data, we are unable to test it. 
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order  to  examine  product  quality.  The  reason  is  that  reputation  and  non-salvageable 
investments made by the  supplier are  likely to  reduce  start-ups'  concerns  about product 
quality.  This argument builds on Diamond's (1989) conclusion that reputation engenders a 
threshold for opportunistic behavior.  As a result, we expect the product quality argument 
to become less important as a determinant of  trade credit use over the life cycle. 
************** 
insert Table 1 
************** 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
We  examine the theoretical predictions of the  previous section using panel data on 328 
business  start-ups.  Little  research  has  been done  on newly  established  entrepreneurial 
firms, simply because the data are not readily available.  For the U.S., the Federal Reserve 
Board's  National  Survey  of  Small  Business  Finances  (NSSBF)  provides  financial 
information on 4,637 privately held firms, but Ang et al.  (2000) report that mean firm age 
in this database is  17.6 years.  As a result, NSSBF is not representative for  start-up firms. 
Furthermore, the database does not include panel data and, therefore, theories that pertain 
to the time series nature oftrade credit cannot be tested (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
In Belgium, all  limited liability firms - except for financial institutions, insurance 
companies, exchange brokers and hospitals - are legally required to file  annual accounts 
with the National Bank as  of start-up.  The  accounting principles that are  applicable  in 
Belgium are comparable to those of the Anglo-Saxon world (see, for instance, Deloof and 
Jegers,  1999).  In 2001,  nearly 270,000  companies  submitted their financial  statements, 
covering more than 75% of GNP.  In addition, these firms have to publish an abstract from 
their foundation charter in the Government Newspaper (Staatsblad) shortly after start-up. 
Each firm receives a unique and chronologically accorded Value Added Tax number the 
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first time it registers with the tax authorities.  This V AT number allowed us  to  identify 
newly established firms and their financial statements as of start-up in the database of the 
National Bank, now also commercialized by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. 
We  identified  652  limited  liability  firms  that  were  founded  in  1992  ill 
manufacturing.  This industry was selected because of  its larger scale of operations, at least 
when compared to  retailers,  wholesalers  or  service  firms.  Entrepreneurs  in  this  sector 
therefore are more likely to lack the personal financial resources to fully finance all assets 
and operations at start-up.  To be included in the sample, firms had to report their industry 
code, i.e.  the European NACE code, at the four-digit level.  All firms  in the  sample are 
narrowly focused and report only one four-digit NACE code. 
This  sample  was  subsequently  cleaned  to  remove  all  firms  that  were  not 
entrepreneurial start-ups.  Using the  foundation charter, true  business  start-ups could be 
distinguished from newly established subsidiaries of  existing firms, split-ups, spin-offs, etc. 
Firms  arising  from  the  incorporation  of a  previously  self-employed  activity,  identified 
through follow-up phone calls, were also removed from the sample.  Our sample thus only 
includes  firms  that  are  first-time  start-ups,  which have no  history  or relationships  with 
banks and suppliers.  These screening criteria reduced the sample to 328 true business start-
ups, spread over 97 manufacturing industries based on their four-digit NACE code.  Also, 
the  first  year of data in our database truly represents the  firm's  start-up  year.  Table 2 
describes the  industry  distribution of the  sample  firms,  based on their two-digit NACE 
code.  The firms are highly represented in the paper, printing and publishing industry (98 
firms);  the  food,  drink  and  tobacco  industry  (51  firms);  and  the  timber  and  wooden 
furniture industry (35 firms). 
************** 
insert Table 2 
************** 
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The data include the financial statements from the first accounting year until 2002, 
resulting  in 2,682  firm-year  observations.  Since  a  number  of firms  were  discontinued 
before 2002, the panel is  unbalanced.  7  We also have access to the annual accounts of all 
incumbent  firms  in  each  of the  corresponding  97  four-digit  NACE  industries  over  the 
window 1992-2002.  These data are used to  calculate the industry level proxy variables.8 
Information on ownership  structure  at  start-up  is  collected from  the  foundation  charter. 
The start-up team on average involves 2.42 entrepreneurs.  The average firm employs 2.82 
persons in the start-up year and its total assets amount to € 244,175 (median of  € 102,269). 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics on asset and financial structure, profitability and 
growth when observations are sorted out according to age.  By the end of 2002, 77 firms 
(23.48%) have discontinued their operations: 48 because of bankruptcy, 26 were liquidated 
voluntarily and 3 firms were taken over. 
The relation between the median liquid to total assets ratio and firm age essentially 
is V-shaped.  Liquid assets are minimal at the age of four (median of 3.69%), but increase 
to 6.80% by the age often.  A reverse pattern more or less holds for the median investment 
in inventories, which are maximal when firms age four (6.93%).  As far as investments in 
tangible fixed assets are concerned, we fmd no clear pattern.  However, ten years old firms 
have a significantly lower fraction of assets invested in property, plant and equipment than 
at  start-up  (30.14%  versus  38.57%),  which  could  be  due  to  depreciation.  These 
conclusions  are  not  affected  when  the  analyses  are  limited  to  firms  that  survive  the 
sampling period. 
7 Furthermore, at the time the data were most recently updated (October 2003), the DVD of Bureau Van Dijk 
contained the  2002 accounts of 201  flnns, which may not be  the entire sample of flrnls  surviving in 2002. 
The  reason  is  that  fmancial  statements  can be fIled  up  to  seven  months  after  the  closing  date  (usually 
December,  31).  Besides, the  process  of entering paper annual  accounts  into  the  electronic database  also 
consumes time.  However, since we have the 2002 accounts of more than 82% of the flrms surviving in 2001, 
biases are unlikely. 
8 We decided to  calculate some of the proxy variables at the four-digit industry level since flrm level values 
may be affected by the fIrm's success/failure, which could result in spurious conclusions.  For instance, flrms 
that are highly successful are likely to have high inventory turnover rates and high fmancing needs. 
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At the time of  start-up, debt on average represents 73.80% of  total assets (median of 
79.31 %).  The average debt ratio increases during the first years after start-up and reaches a 
maximum by the age of seven (129.70%).  In contrast, the median debt ratio decreases over 
time  albeit  the  pattern  is  not  monotonic  in  firm  age.  The  reason  for  this  conflicting 
movement  is  due  to  a  number  of distressed  firms  that  accumulate  losses  before  they 
eventually are  liquidated,  which have  a  substantial  influence  on the  average  debt  ratio. 
Accounts payable on average represent 21.79% of total assets in the start-up year (median 
of 17.12%).  This percentage is  high compared to earlier figures  reported for  established 
firms.  Petersen and Rajan (1997), for instance, show a median ratio of  accounts payable to 
total assets of 9.95% for  industrial firms  whereas Fisman and Love (2003) report  8.8%. 
For Belgian industrial firms older than ten years, by contrast, accounts payable on average 
represent 15.28% of  total assets in 1993.9  These numbers illustrate the importance of  trade 
credit in Belgium,  which is  used even more extensively by  start-ups compared to  more 
established firms.l0  Table 3 also  shows that there  is  a tendency for  trade  credit  use  to 
decrease as firms  grow older, but this pattern again is  not monotonic in firm age.  By the 
age often, average accounts payable represent 18.91 % of  total assets (median of 14.58%). 
Cash generation (EBITDA to total assets) is relatively low in the first year (median 
of 12.81%),  but  during  the  years  thereafter  the  median  fluctuates  closely  around  17%. 
Overall,  mean  and  median  growth  in  total  assets  vary  significantly  over  time,  which 
suggests  that  growth  occurs  in  shocks.  The  low  growth  figures  at  the  age  of ten 
presumably are due to the bad economic conditions in 2002. 
9 Deloof and Jegers (1999) report a much higher ratio of accounts payable to  total assets in their sample of 
661  large Belgian firms (average of 27.9%; median of22.5%).  However, more than one third of their sample 
are distribution firms, which typically have higher accounts payable than industrial firms.  More importantly, 
they report that most of the firms they examine are  affiliated with other companies, which is likely to  boost 
interfllTIl credit (see for instance Deloof and Jegers, 1996). 
10  Fisman  and Love  (2003)  document  that  trade  credit  fmancing  is  inversely  related  to  fmancial  market 
development, which could explain the  high importance of accounts payable in Belgium.  Jegers and Deloof 
(1999) report that in November 1995, Belgian total stock market capitalization amounted to  44% of GDP, 
compared to 93% for the U.S. and 130% for the U.K. 
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(i)  Variables 
Determinants and Dynamics of  Trade Credit Use 
************** 
insert Table 3 
************** 
In this study we wish to examine why start-ups use trade credit and how trade credit use 
varies  over the  life  cycle.  Similarly to  Petersen  and  Rajan (1997),  Deloof and  Jegers 
(1999), Fisman and Love (2003) and others, the dependent variable in our study is accounts 
payable over total assets.  11  However, as the level of accounts payable is the result of both 
the supply and the demand for trade credit, we recognize in the discussion of our results 
that we are  only  able  to estimate reduced-form coefficients, which include  both effects. 
Next, Ng et al.  (1999) document that credit terms vary widely across industries, but have 
only  limited variation  within industries.  These  findings  support  the  idea  that  a  firm's 
industry is an important determinant of offered credit terms.  To control for other than the 
above-discussed determinants of  trade credit, we construct industry dummy variables at the 
two-digit  NACE  level.  12  Only  when  the  industry  contains  five  start-ups  is  the 
corresponding dummy variable included in the regressions (the parameter estimates for the 
13  dummy  variables  are  not  reported).13  Consistent  with  the  discussion  above,  the 
explanatory variables are grouped into four categories: (1) fmancial constraints and price 
11  When the ratio of accounts payable to total liabilities is  used as an alternative dependent variable, we find 
that the results - which can be obtained from the author upon request - are very similar, even tough the latter 
model has somewhat less power (lower adjusted R-square).  The correlation between these two measures of 
trade credit use amounts to 0.7607. 
12 Petersen and Rajan (1997) also follow this approach, but construct industry dummy variables based on one-
digit  SIC  codes.  Simultaneously,  they  include  purchases  on  account,  calculated  as  the  percentage  of 
purchases made on account times the finn's costs of goods sold,  to  control for  the  supply of trade  credit. 
Unfortunately, under Belgian accounting legislation firms are not required to report this information. 
13  Since firms in industries with less than five start-ups may differ significantly from one another, we have re-
estimated the  models  after removing  these finns from the  sample (and including only  12  industry dummy 
variables).  We fmd that our conclusions are robust; the results can be obtained upon request. 
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discrimination, (2) financing advantage, (3) private benefits of control and (4) transaction 
costs. 
Following Petersen and Rajan (1997), we  control for  FIRM AGE under the form 
10g(1 +age) and FIRM SIZE, using the logarithm of  total assets.  In addition, we include the 
start-up's ratio of tangible fixed assets to total  assets  as  these assets can easily serve  as 
security for bank loans.  Rajan and Zingales (1995), for instance, find that asset tangibility 
and debt  ratios  are  significantly positively correlated  for  listed  firms.  Start-ups  whose 
assets are highly tangible, therefore, are likely to  have easier access to  bank debt,  which 
could reduce their demand for  trade credit.  For fast growing start-ups, the magnitude of 
operations may be difficult to predict.  So, we include the firm's total assets growth rate 
(ASSET GROWTH) and expect it to positively affect accounts payable. 14  For the  same 
reason,  we control for  business  cycle effects, measured by last year's real  GNP  growth 
(GNP GROWTH).  To eliminate outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorized at 5%-
95% (see Tuckey, 1962). 
(U)  Determinants of  trade credit use 
We  start  our discussion with the  results  from  pooled ordinary  least  squares  estimation. 
Table 4,  column one  shows that internal  cash generation significantly negatively affects 
trade credit use during the first ten years after start-up.  Also, start-ups that pay a higher 
price for their bank debt increase their reliance on commercial debt.  Together, these results 
support the argument that trade  credit  is  a costly  source of fmancing  that is  used  more 
extensively when firms are financially constrained, both internally (EBITDA/ASSETS) and 
externally  (COST  OF  BANK DEBT).  Next,  we  find  that  for  buyers  in  high-growth 
14  We recognize that sales growth is  a better measure, but only large firms are required to report sales under 
Belgian accounting  legislation.  To qualify  as  large,  firms  must satisfy two  out of three  of the  following 
criteria: total assets of€ 3,125,000, sales of€ 6,255,000 and 50 employees.  Firms employing more than 100 
people are always deemed large under Belgian accounting legislation. 
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industries (IND  SALES GROWTH), where input market competition likely is  lower, the 
cost of bank debt even has a significantly greater impact on accounts payable.  The latter 
finding  is  consistent with the price discrimination motive for offering trade credit; when 
buyers are financially constrained, as measured by the cost of  their bank debt, they will use 
the extended trade credit.  Nevertheless, we consider the latter conclusion as tentative since 
suppliers  may  also  hold  a  larger  implicit  equity  stake  in  firms  with  favorable  growth 
prospects.  Further research therefore is needed to investigate this relation in more detail. 
Next, the fmancing  advantage theories of suppliers  regarding high-risk  firms  are 
widely supported by the data.  First,  in industries with a high start-up failure  rate,  firms 
borrow more from their suppliers when raw materials are frequently replaced.  This result 
refines the conclusion of Wilson and Summers (2002) that suppliers are better placed to 
assess buyer risk and have lower collection costs than financial institutions; our findings 
suggest that  suppliers  have  an  information  advantage  particularly  for  buyers  that  place 
frequent orders.  If this advantage results in a larger supply of commercial debt, high-risk 
start-ups, which have only limited access to bank debt, will gladly accept the offered trade 
credit.  Second, we find that in highly concentrated industries, start-ups that are more likely 
to  fail  are  financed less  by their suppliers.  In concentrated industries, suppliers may be 
more dependent on individual customers such that their ability to control/restrain high-risk 
buyers  is  reduced.  Specifically,  when  a  buyer  could be  an  important  source  of future 
business, suppliers will be inclined to (continue to) provide credit to capture this business, 
even  when the  buyer  does  not  respect  credit terms.  Suppliers  may  insure  themselves 
against this risk by limiting their trade credit supply in advance, patiicularly in industries 
where start-ups face higher odds of becoming financially distressed.  Third, in industries 
where inventories largely consist of raw materials, risky start-ups borrow more from their 
suppliers.  When  raw  materials  are  only  slowly  consumed  in  the  production  process, 
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suppliers  will  consider  the  collateral  value  of their  supplies  to  be  higher.  This  could 
provide them with an advantage in financing high-risk firms,  from which buyers that can 
hardly  access  bank  debt  may  benefit.  Finally,  note  that  IND  FAILURE  RATE  is 
significantly negatively related to accounts payable, ceteris paribus.  This result seems hard 
to  explain, knowing that high-risk start-ups are financed less by banks (e.g., Huyghebaeli 
and  Van  de  Gucht,  2002)  and  therefore  may  have  a  higher  demand  for  trade  credit. 
However, the negative relation likely reflects that suppliers too are  less willing to provide 
credit to high-risk start-ups unless they can mitigate problems via information collection, 
controlling buyers and/or repossessing goods in the event of  default. 
When ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneur, start-ups 
use  trade  credit  more  extensively.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  argument  that 
suppliers are more lenient than banks towards financially distressed firms, which is valued 
especially by entrepreneurs with substantial private benefits of control as measured by their 
ownership in the firm. 
We find evidence that transaction costs affect accounts payable outstanding.  First, 
start-ups  in  industries  with  a  higher  turnover  of raw  materials  (IND  INVENTORY 
TURNOVER) borrow more from their suppliers.  Since firms that frequently replace their 
inventories face higher transaction costs of paying bills, this finding  suggests that buyers 
centralize  payments  and  use  the  extended  commercial  debt  to  bridge  the  era  between 
purchase  and  payment.  Also,  in  industries  where  investments  in  intangible  assets  are 
important (IND INTANGIBLES/ASSETS), firms  use  trade  credit more  extensively.  As 
industries with large investments  in intangible assets  can be  expected to  produce highly 
specialized,  technical products,  this relation supports  the  product quality  motive  behind 
extending and using trade credit. 
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The results further show that age reduces trade credit use; the coefficient for FIRM 
AGE  (-0.0357)  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Moreover,  age  is  an 
economically significant determinant of accounts payable: when firms have reached the age 
of ten, their use of trade credit relative to total assets has decreased by an absolute 8.56%, 
.  'b  15  cetens pan us.  This  negative  relation,  however,  conflicts  with  the  results  found  by 
Petersen and Rajan (1997), who examine small but established firms.  For start-ups, it may 
reflect a decreasing need for external financing and/or increasing access to other financing 
sources as firms grow older and investments stabilize.  Consistent with Petersen and Rajan 
(1997), FIRM SIZE is  significantly positively related to  the ratio of accounts payable to 
total  assets.  Tangible fixed  assets  significantly  reduce  the  reliance  on trade  credit.  A 
negative  relation  is  as  expected  since  firms  with  assets  that  can  be  easily  pledged  as 
collateral  likely  will  find  it  easier  to  raise  reasonably  priced  bank  debt.  Finally,  and 
consistent with the literature, firms use trade credit more extensively during years of high 
growth, both when measured at the firm level (ASSET GROWTH) and captured economy-
wide (GNP GROWTH). 
In order to further investigate the relation between firm age and accounts payable, 
we construct age dummy variables.  We use the start-up year as the reference age category 
in the ensuing regression analysis, whose results are reported in column two of Table 4. 
The analysis reveals that accounts payable are more or less monotonic decreasing in firm 
age.  From the age of seven onwards, trade credit use is significantly lower than during the 
start-up  year.  Finally,  the  model  has  a  somewhat  lower  adjusted  R-square  (31.38%) 
compared to  that in column one (31.44%), which justifies our specification of the aging 
pattern in column one. 
15  This percentage is calculated as -0.0357 * [In (1 + 10) -In(1  +0)]. 
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In  column  three,  we  repOli  pooled  OLS  regreSSIOn  results  when  the  model  is 
estimated  solely  on  the  subsample  of non-failing  firms,  i.e.  the  firms  that  did  not  go 
bankrupt nor were  liquidated voluntarily  during  the  sampling period.  Since  financially 
distressed firms are likely to stretch their payments as long as possible, we expected these 
firms  to  introduce noise  in the regressions.  Indeed, the adjusted R-square of the  model 
when solely estimated on the non-failing firms  increases to 34.90% (compared to 31.44% 
in column one).  Interestingly, all above-documented relations are  robust,  except for the 
interaction term FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY TURNOVER, which is no longer 
statistically significant in column three.  Given that we control for  industry effects in all 
regressions, this finding likely indicates that especially the firms that eventually failed have 
been able to benefit from the information advantage that suppliers have when raw materials 
are frequently replaced.  As a result, suppliers have more extensively financed these firms. 
OLS estimation may produce biased and inconsistent results owing to its failure to 
control for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity.  This problem will occur when the 
disturbance term incorporates time-invariant  omitted factors  that  are  contemporaneously 
correlated with the model's explanatory variables.  We therefore re-estimated our models 
using random effects panel estimation; the results are reported in columns four to six of 
Table  4.  Baltagi  (2001)  argues  that  the  random  effects  model  is  an  appropriate 
specification if  the cross-sectional observations (i.e., the 328 start-ups) are randomly drawn 
from  a  large  population.  Furthermore,  since  some  of the  explanatory  variables  in  our 
models  are  time-invariant,  we  are  unable to  include  firm-level  dummy  variables  (fixed 
effects panel estimation).  Nevertheless, the  computed Hausman statistic rejects  random 
effects in favor of fixed effects, but only when the impact of age is measured continuously 
(m =  17.2170  with a p-value of 0.0279),  not when it  is  specified by means of dummy 
variables (m =  20.2927 with a p-value of 0.2595).  Overall, the results in column four to six 
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show that for some variables, statistical significance is  reduced but still exceeds the  10% 
level.  The only exception occurs for the variable FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY 
TURNOVER, which we attribute to the fact that firms with only one year of data are not 
incorporated  in  the  estimations.  These  firms  basically  are  the  ones  that  discontinue 
operations  because  of financial  distress.  Column three  already  showed that  within the 
subsample of non-failing firms, this interaction term is no longer significant.  Finally, note 
that the explanatory power of the models is  lower under random effects panel estimation 
than  under  pooled  OLS  estimation  (adjusted  R-square  of 19.13%  in  column  four,  for 
example). 
(iii) Dynamics of  trade credit use 
************** 
insert Table 4 
************** 
In this section, we investigate the dynamics of  trade credit use in more detail using pooled 
OLS  estimation.  For this  purpose,  we  interact the  variables  that  represent  the  various 
determinants  of accounts  payable  with  FIRM  AGE.  To  minimize  the  problem  of 
multicollinearity,  we  separately  test  the  impact  of age  for  each  of the  four  groups  of 
explanatory variables.  The results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5, column one shows that age does not affect the positive relation between the 
cost of bank debt and the industry sales growth rate on the one hand and the use of trade 
credit on the other hand.  So, start-ups paying a relatively high price for  their bank debt 
continue to use trade credit more extensively when the industry is growing, independent of 
their age. 
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The results in column two reveal that age has only a limited impact on the relation 
between trade credit use and the variables that represent the various sources of a supplier 
financing advantage.  Indeed, only the impact of FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY 
TURNOVER becomes smaller when start-ups mature.  From this result, we can conclude 
that the information advantage of suppliers resulting from repeated ordering is particularly 
important  at  the  time  of start-up,  but  decreases  as  firms  grow  older. 16  When  more 
information can be accessed as firms age, suppliers may lose their information advantage. 
We  have  already  explained  that  the  firms  in  our  sample  make  their  annual  accounts 
publicly  available  via the  Belgian National  Bank.  Also,  a  special  institute,  called the 
Risicocentrale,  collects directly from banks  information on the firm's outstanding loans, 
such as  the  amount and  types  of credits  with payment arrears;  this  information can be 
consulted by banks in new loan applications.  The  advantage of suppliers in controlling 
high-risk buyers and selling repossessed goods after default, however, are not significantly 
affected by firm age. 
Column  three  m  Table  5  shows  that  the  positive  relation  between  ownership 
concentration and accounts payable is significantly negatively affected by firm age. 17  This 
finding might reflect that entrepreneurs become more confident in their venture's survival 
chances and, therefore, reduce their reliance on costly trade credit financing over the firm's 
life cycle. 
Finally, column four in Table 5 shows that inventory turnover as a determinant of 
accounts payable  is  not affected  by firm  age.  This  result  is  not  surprising  as  it  is  the 
frequency by which orders are placed that determines the transaction costs of  paying bills. 
16 An alternative explanation, that originates from the results in Table 4, might be that this negative relation is 
driven by  the  failing  finns,  on whom we  only have data during  a limited number of years  after  start-up. 
However, when we estimate the model of Table 5,  column two  on the  subsample of non-failing finns,  the 
variable FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY TURNOVER * FIRM AGE remains significantly negatively 
related to accounts payable. 
17  In column three, we had to  remove the variable FIRM AGE from  the  regression model since it was too 
highly correlated with OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION * FIRM AGE. 
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Conversely, start-ups  in high-tech industries use  less trade  credit as  they mature, which 
suggests that product quality becomes less impoliant as  a determinant of accounts payable 
over the life cycle.  When buyers and suppliers invest in their relationship as it lasts longer, 
supplier reputation and non-salvageable investments are likely to substitute for trade credit 
as a signal of  product quality. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
************** 
insert Table 5 
************** 
In this paper, we provide new evidence on why firms use trade credit from examining the 
determinants and dynamics of accounts payable using a sample of entrepreneurial business 
start-ups from 1992, which subsequently are followed during a period often years.  At the 
time of start-up, these firms  face high default risk and fmancial constraints are typically 
large.  Also, they have no established relationships with banks and suppliers.  We find that 
these distinct characteristics influence start-up commercial debt use.  In addition, we find 
that trade credit practice reflects the changing features of  maturing business start-ups. 
Start-ups  that  are  financially  constrained,  measured  by  their  internal  cash 
production and the price of their bank debt,  use more trade credit.  This effect is stronger 
when the industry is growing and suppliers may have an incentive to discriminate between 
cash and credit customers.  Even if suppliers practicing price discrimination drive the latter 
result, it cannot be interpreted as suppliers are violating the law.  Indeed, it may still be the 
case  that  suppliers  offer  equal  terms  to  all  customers  while  especially  financially 
constrained firms actively use the offered credit. 
Next, suppliers appear to have an advantage in financing high-risk customers, but 
only under particular conditions.  First, high-risk start-ups use more trade credit when raw 
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materials  are  frequently  replaced,  which  supports  the  idea  that,  because  of repeated 
contracting,  suppliers  can  regularly  update  their  information  on buyer  creditworthiness. 
Second,  commercial debt  use  by risky  start-ups  is  higher when the  industry  has  a  low 
concentration ratio.  As  suppliers  in  such industries  are  unlikely to  highly  depend on  a 
newly  established  firm,  they  may  have  more  opportunities  to  control  high-risk  buyers. 
Third,  high-risk  start-ups  borrow  more  from  their  suppliers  when  inventories  largely 
consist of raw materials, which suggests that slowly processed inventories have a higher 
collateral value.  Up till now, publicly policy dealing with start-up financial constraints has 
focused on how the equity base of these firms can be improved and on how banks can be 
spurred to  provide  credit  more  eagerly.  Our results,  however,  show that  in  particular 
circumstances, suppliers may have an advantage in  financing high-risk start-ups.  Public 
policy therefore should be more fine-tuned to take the special role of suppliers in financing 
start-ups into account. 
Private benefits of control also seem to influence trade credit use of entrepreneurial 
start-ups.  In  particular,  when  ownership  is  highly  concentrated  in  the  hands  of the 
entrepreneur, firms  borrow more from their suppliers.  This result is  consistent with the 
argument  that  suppliers  are  more  lenient  than  credit  market  lenders  towards  firms  in 
financial distress, a feature that is treasured especially by entrepreneurs who value private 
benefits of control.  Over time,  this  relation becomes  less  important, which presumably 
reflects the entrepreneur's increasing confidence in the firm's survival chances. 
Finally, the transaction costs theories of trade credit are supported by the data.  On 
the one hand, start-ups have higher accounts payable when rapid turnover of raw materials 
is standard industry practice.  This relation, which is not affected by firm age, is consistent 
with the idea that the transaction costs of paying bills  can be  reduced through payment 
centralization.  On the other hand, in industries with highly specialized, technical products, 
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where quality of input goods  is  likely to  be  important, start-ups borrow more from their 
suppliers.  Not surprisingly, the results indicate that product quality becomes less important 
as a determinant of  trade credit use when firms grow older. 
While our research makes a valuable contribution to the literature on trade credit 
and entrepreneurial financing,  it  also raises  some  new questions.  Most importantly, the 
results indicate that not all dynamics are captured and that there may be other reasons why 
firms reduce their reliance on trade credit as they grow older.  Indeed, we find that firm age 
has  an  independent negative effect on trade credit use  after controlling for  the  currently 
available theories of trade credit use.  Second, most relations are  interpreted as  resulting 
from both supply and demand side effects;  more  detailed data could help to  disentangle 
these effects, which would allow to more directly test the theoretical arguments.  Finally, 
our conclusions are obtained from pooled OLS and random effects panel estimation, but we 
find  some  indication  that  the  model  should  be  re-assessed  using  fixed  effects  panel 
estimation.  Unfortunately, our dataset is not suited for these validation estimations. 
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Table 1:  Summary of  testable predictions 
Cross-sectional  Time series 
impact  impact 
Financial constraints and price discrimination 
EBITDAI  ASSETS  - No impact 
COST OF BANK DEBT  +  No impact 
COST OF BANK DEBT * IND SALES GROWTH  +  -
Financing advantage 
Information advantage of supplier (FAILURE RATE *  +  -
IND INVENTORY TURNOVER) 
Controlling advantage of suppliers (FAILURE RATE *  - + 
IND CONCENTRATION) 
Liquidation advantage of suppliers (FAILURE RATE *  +  -
IND INVENTORY MIX) 
Private benefits of  control 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION  +  -
Transaction costs 
Transaction  costs  of trade  cycle  (IND  INVENTORY  +  No impact 
TURNOVER) 
Quality motive (IND INT  ANGIBLESI  ASSETS)  +  -
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Table 2: Industry distribution of start-ups 
NACE code  Description  N um ber of firms 
22  Production and preliminary processing of metals  1 finn 
23  Extraction of  minerals other than metalliferous and  1 finn 
energy-producing minerals; peat extraction 
24  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  7 finns 
25  Chemical industry  5 firms 
31  Manufacture of metal articles (except for mechanical,  16 firms 
electrical and instrument engineering and vehicles) 
32  Mechanical engineering  8 finns 
34  Electrical engineering  13 finns 
36  Manufacture of other means of  transport  4 firms 
37  Instrument engineering  15 finns 
41142  Food, drink and tobacco industry  51  finns 
43  Textile industry  20 firms 
44  Leather and leather goods industry (except footwear and  4 firms 
clothing) 
45  Footwear and clothing industry  26 finns 
46  Timber and wooden furniture industries  35 finns 
47  Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing and  98 firms 
publishing 
48  Processing of rubber and plastics  6 finns 
49  Other manufacturing industries  18 finns 
TOTAL  328 firms 
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics on asset structure, fmancial  structure, profitability and growth for the sample of 328 business start-ups, when 
observations are sorted out according to age 
Age=1  Age=2  Age=3  Age=4  Age=5  Age=6  Age=7  Age=8  Age=9  Age=10 
CASH & MARKETABLE SEC/ASSETS 
Mean  0.1295  0.1103  0.1234  0.0914  0.1002  0.1143  0.1331  0.1344  0.1482  0.1558 
Median  0.0648  0.0504  0.0399  0.0369  0.0397  0.0502  0.0704  0.0610  0.0634  0.0680 
INVENTORIES/ASSETS 
Mean  0.1080  0.1125  0.1486  0.1351  0.1350  0.1260  0.1096  0.1119  0.1078  0.1109 
Median  0.0501  0.0512  0.0633  0.0693  0.0679  0.0548  0.0438  0.0523  0.0508  0.0443 
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS/ASSETS 
Mean  0.3851  0.3834  0.3912  0.3861  0.3715  0.3752  0.3790  0.3546  0.3551  0.3374 
Median  0.3857  0.3691  0.3687  0.3712  0.3578  0.3750  0.3755  0.3466  0.3584  0.3014 
DEBT/ASSETS 
Mean  0.7380  0.8038  0.8830  0.9138  1.2109  1.0440  1.2970  0.9631  0.7531  0.7262 
Median  0.7931  0.8094  0.7939  0.7752  0.7859  0.7723  0.7550  0.7000  0.7115  0.6752 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE/ASSETS 
Mean  0.2179  0.2380  0.2211  0.2245  0.2164  0.2225  0.1988  0.2030  0.1983  0.1891 
Median  0.1712  0.1982  0.1784  0.1795  0.1748  0.1801  0.1389  0.1508  0.1518  0.1458 
EBITDAIASSETS 
Mean  0.1140  0.1380  0.1755  0.1610  0.0912  0.1352  0.1849  0.1778  0.1633  0.1379 
Median  0.1281  0.1776  0.1819  0.1718  0.1766  0.1802  0.1703  0.1670  0.1650  0.1658 
ASSET GROWTH 
Mean  0.0400  0.2228  0.1835  0.1250  0.1423  0.1458  0.1425  0.1294  0.1648  0.1150 
Median  0.0263  0.0869  0.1106  0.0590  0.0731  0.0694  0.0630  0.0525  0.0744  0.0017 
Number of  observations  328  297  294  284  272  265  251  246  244  201 
29 Determinants and Dynamics o/Trade Credit Use 
Table 4: Determinants of  trade credit use based on panel data of328 business start-ups over 1992-2002 
Pooled OLS estimation  Panel estimation (random effects) 
Total  Total  Non-failing  Total  Total  Non-failing 
sample  sample  sample  sample  sample  sample 
Constant  -0.1349  -0.1689*  -0.1892**  -0.1188  -0.1430  -0.1293 
Financial constraints and price discrimination 
EBITDA/  ASSETS  -0.1279***  -0.1299***  -0.1471***  -0.0812***  -0.0846***  -0.1170*** 
COST OF BANK DEBT  0.4875***  0.4877***  0.4762***  0.4210***  0.4017***  0.3673*** 
COST OF BANK DEBT * IND SALES GROWTH  0.0139***  0.0140***  0.0128***  0.0142**  0.0149**  0.0158** 
Financing advantage 
FAILURE RATE  -1.2310***  -1.2216***  -1.2987***  -1.6693**  -1.6559**  -1.1547* 
! 
FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY TURNOVER  0.0173***  0.0174***  0.0092  0.0090  0.0090  0.0114 
FAILURE RATE * IND CONCENTRATION  -0.0782**  -0.0783**  -0.1447***  -0.1195*  -0.1165*  -0.1931*** 
FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY MIX  1.6644***  1.6430***  2.5532***  2.6268***  2.5849***  2.5113*** 
Private benefits of  control 
OWNERSHIP CON  CENTRA  TION  0.1618*  0.1642*  0.1922**  0.1699*  0.1713*  0.2113* 
Transaction costs 
IND INVENTORY TURNOVER  0.0259***  0.0257***  0.0342***  0.0374***  0.0371 ***  0.0330*** 
IND INTANGIBLES/ASSETS  0.6494**  0.6272*  1.0794***  0.7569*  0.7380*  0.9547* 
Control variables 
FIRM AGE  -0.0357***  -0.0332***  -0.0204***  -0.0170*** 
AGE=2DUMMY  -0.0169  -0.0044 
AGE=3DUMMY  -0.0299  -0.0107 
AGE=4DUMMY  -0.0221  -0.0023 
AGE=5DUMMY  -0.0307**  -0.0060 
AGE=6DUMMY  -0.0259  -0.0108 
AGE=7DUMMY  -0.0468***  -0.0229* 
AGE=8DUMMY  -0.0491 ***  -0.0222* 
AGE=9DUMMY  -0.0616***  -0.0308** 
AGE=10 DUMMY  -0.0719***  -0.0392*** 
FIRM SIZE  0.0273***  0.0277***  0.0268***  0.0204***  0.0220***  0.0132*** 
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS/ASSETS  -0.2262***  -0.2265***  -0.2261***  -0.2010***  -0.2033***  -0.2014*** 
ASSET GROWTH  0.0743***  0.0741 ***  0.0691 ***  0.0662***  0.0640***  0.0687*** 
GNP GROWTH  0.5068*  0.5532*  0.4358  0.3405*  0.3750*  0.3187 
Number of observations  1968  1968  1720  1927  1927  1685 
Adiusted R-square  31.44%  31.38%  34.90%  19.13%  19.72%  19.47% 
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Table 5: Dynamics of  trade credit use based on panel data of  328 business start-ups over 1992-2002 
Pooled OLS estimation 
(Total sample) 
Constant  -0.1367  -0.1575*  -0.1970**  -0.1708* 
Financial constraints and price discrimination 
EBITDAI  ASSETS  -0.1280***  -0.1273***  -0.1278***  -0.1274*** 
COST OF BANK DEBT  0.4885***  0.5017***  0.4892***  0.4921 *** 
COST OF BANK DEBT * lND SALES GROWTH  0.0152*  0.0139***  0.0138***  0.0139*** 
COST OF BANK DEBT * IND SALES GROWTH* FIRM AGE  -0.0008 
Financing advantage 
FAILURE RATE  -1.2315***  -1.3708***  -1.2308***  -1.2248*** 
FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY TURNOVER  0.0173***  0.0511***  0.0173***  0.0176*** 
FAILURE RATE * lND CONCENTRATION  -0.0780**  -0.1555**  -0.0783**  -0.0786** 
FAILURE RATE * IND INVENTORY MIX  1.6640***  2.3328***  1.9951 ***  1.6563*** 
FAILURE RATE * lND INVENTORY TURNOVER * FIRM AGE  -0.0214*** 
FAILURE RATE * lND CONCENTRATION * FIRM AGE  0.0410 
FAILURE RATE * lND INVENTORY MIX * FIRM AGE  -0.2172 
Private benefits of  control 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION  0.1615*  0.1559*  0.2239*  0.1691 ** 
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION * FIRM AGE  -0.0356*** 
Transaction costs 
IND INVENTORY TURNOVER  0.0259***  0.0300***  0.0259***  0.0336*** 
IND INTANGIBLES/ASSETS  0.6388**  0.7113**  0.6430**  3.5992*** 
IND INVENTORY TURNOVER * FIRM AGE  -0.0044 
IND INTANGIBLES/ASSETS * FIRM AGE  -1.7177*** 
Control variables 
FIRM AGE  -0.0345*  -0.0184*  -0.0201 ** 
FIRM SIZE  0.0273***  0.0272***  0.0273***  0.0274*** 
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS/ASSETS  -0.2262***  -0.2258***  -0.2260***  -0.2276*** 
ASSET GROWTH  0.0741 ***  0.0743***  0.0744***  0.0746*** 
GNP GROWTH  0.5072*  0.4923*  0.5026*  0.5050* 
Number of observations  1968  1968  1968  1968 
Adjusted R-square  31.41 %  31.97%  31.43%  31.71% 
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